“从存量视频的二次剪辑，到从零开始的创意视频创作，这里面有很大的区别，但背后是技术本身的持续迭代与进步。

*ST英飞：董事长刘肇怀辞职

43746 ★

摘要：他害怕人员流动太快，把公司的核心资料偷走，就给全公司上线了区块链存证技术。

钛媒体：44TB硬盘推出后，客户在实际部署中更看重哪些方面？俞康：衡量价格不是按一块盘多少钱算，而是按TB算。

1、米6体育据了解，该平台通过生成式AI、数字孪生、工程仿真、3D数字化及供应链智能体协同等技术，重构包装研发全流程，实现从创意生成、结构设计、工程验证到快速落地的全流程智能化。

最大的问题，毫无疑问是钱。米6体育而他们的对手，则是39岁依然在创造历史的梅西。

2、科技向善的中国答案（评论员观察）

世界杯淘汰赛，法国先后击败瑞典、巴拉圭、摩洛哥，全部零封对手，攻守兼备；西班牙先后淘汰奥地利、葡萄牙、比利时，三场淘汰赛仅丢1球，也是攻守兼备。

3、2年3380万！正式签约！维金斯联手字母哥

瑞士队（第十四，升5位）凭借闯入八强的出色战绩大幅跃升，挪威队（第十九，升12位）同样杀入四分之一决赛，排名飙升12位，进步最为显著。

4、宿茂臻透露高准翼伤情，谈张弛退役仪式，直言打国安不用动员

满足大量场景诉求。

5、豪横？切尔西无缘欧战仍花3.2亿连签7人！5200万镑敲定26岁法国中卫

红鸟老板卡尔迪纳莱将尝试调和阿莱格里与伊布之间的关系，最近还传出了加利亚尼重返管理层、作为关键人物进行调解的传闻。

在巨头林立的夹缝中，AI创业者必须找到自己的生存法则：深刻理解并满足特定市场的真实需求。

先想清楚"我想往哪个方向攒能力"，再去找对应的实习，比海投一百份"行政助理"有用得多。

6、排名越高工资帽越高！CBA神奇新政引争议，三外援政策尘埃落定

赵晋荣埋了几年的伏笔终于派上了大用场。

澳大利亚2-0击败土耳其的比赛则是防守反击的教科书。

7、PS5国服商店多款游戏下架又砍实体！前路在何方

截至目前，真正离队的主力是西班牙边卫库库雷利亚，他以约6000万欧元转会费加盟皇家马德里。

梦幻的乐园灯景与亮马河夜景交相呼应，夜间体验的丰富也让乐园城市休闲空间的定位进一步被明确。

8、望天际VS海潮玖序：谁更懂“静谧”？克而瑞深度测评揭秘顶豪居住真相

这背后的关键支撑是，特斯拉季度交付汽车 48.01 万辆，同比增长 25%，环比增长 34%，两年以来最好的季度交付。

英格兰以L组头名出线，小组赛2胜1平，1/16决赛2-1险胜刚果（金），1/8决赛3-2力克东道主墨西哥，1/4决赛鏖战120分钟加时2-1淘汰挪威，半决赛则在先进一球的情况下被阿根廷2-1逆转，遗憾止步四强。

耐克第一次真正意义上的DTC转向，发生在2020年前后。

9、夜读丨儿时枣香

第二种游戏也没有纸面上那么轻松。

阿莫林3-4-2-1的核心逻辑是，三中卫不能只会防守，必须具备从中路直接破解第一道压迫线的传球能力；两名翼卫需要同时拥有顶级往返能力和一对一爆破力，进攻端能顶到边锋位，防守端第一时间回撤补位。

10、美呆了！不用跑去新疆了！绍兴版“孤独的树”，突然火了！

阵容如此大幅度的变动，自然引来了关于拉菲尼亚可能离队的传闻。

尽管阿根廷国内有报道称他已口头同意带队至2030年世界杯。

1、A股三大指数集体收跌，全市近5000只个股飘绿

GLP-1的故事告诉行业一个朴素的道理：科学可以等你，但市场不会。

2、山东创新“金融链主”工作机制助力19条标志性产业链蓬勃发展

而阿根廷这边，恩佐与麦卡利斯特能否破解瑞士的中场绞杀，持续为锋线输送炮弹同样至关重要。

3、2-1，世界杯进决赛：梅西双助，绝杀英格兰，西班牙阿根廷争冠

最该先补的，是信息差。网友的日常“办公生活”，能有多邪修？我也是被惊艳了！西班牙是冠军。

4、23分大胜晋级8强！女篮世青赛淘汰欧洲劲旅：中国队第三次杀进前八

现下瑞士人对于米兰而言犹如鸡肋，食之无味，弃之可惜，只能期望他像托纳利一样在二年级爆发式成长。

5、谢贤被曝因肺炎离世已出殡，狄波拉与儿孙现身火葬场，已办完后事

沈亦晨将光计算的发展划分为三个阶段：2015年以前是理论探索期；2015年到2025年是产品突破期；未来10年将是市场渗透期。

6、Patreon CEO：裁员93人占员工总数20%，并非因为AI将替代人类

联合创始人朱政同样是清华系背景，中科院博士、清华博士后，现任通用世界模型北京市重点实验室主任，负责学术端的深度。

但本质上，国资出资有一种矛盾。

反观山东泰山，全场表现可谓全线被动，多重致命问题被无限放大。

7、国际主流媒体讲述冰城故事向全球传递中国发展新图景

巴萨和阿贾克斯双方都没有释放出任何协议可能生变的信号，税务问题被视为唯一阻碍。

其中唯一一次世界杯正式比赛交锋发生在1994年美国世界杯小组赛，当时荷兰2-1击败摩洛哥。

8、嫡系四将离队获赞，功勋外教遭弃寒心，这波操作，看不懂也想不通

现实情况是，马德里竞技拒绝与巴萨进行任何接触，并坚称阿尔瓦雷斯下赛季将继续留队。

与此同时，海外产能布局正在加速：宁德时代匈牙利工厂、比亚迪巴西基地、国轩高科美国合资工厂、远景动力西班牙工厂。

韩国队主教练洪明甫的战术体系则以极致体能拖底，主打高位逼抢与快速转换，全场高强度奔跑是球队鲜明标签。

面对强队时收缩防线打反击，面对弱队时则掌控球权层层推进，既能蹲坑死守也能高位逼抢。

万人空巷的震撼！西班牙回国获国王+首相接见 180万人参加夺冠游行南京同曦官宣：与杜润旺李玮颢完成签约，期待新赛季取得好成绩被网友家的“洗碗机用法”惊艳了，换个思路，家务立马少一半！ 39岁韩德君“复出”重返辽篮：出任副总经理+领队度过重建期阵痛

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世界模型“六小龙”在WAIC吵起来了！行业红利就在非共识里

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（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

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